How a New Peace Talk May Proceed

By Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.

In a recent article I wrote which was roughly titled “A New Perspective on the Mindanao Problem Based on Some Historical and Current Realities”, I tried to surmise some lessons and current insights based on the experience with the peace process as it has been. They may be worth mentioning here:

Lessons

1. there is no one-shot formula to peace but any peaceful means is worth trying;
2. any attempt to build peace will not succeed unless we build a critical mass of supportive peace constituency;
3. people outside of the direct parties in the conflict should be given the chance to participate because the concern for peace is not confined to the direct parties just as the effect of conflict is;
4. peace is not merely the absence of armed confrontation but it is social justice in all its form; and
5. the ultimate goal of any peace effort is ‘personal cleansing’, that is, freeing one’s mind and heart from homegrown hatred, polarity, and giving dignity to every human being.

Current Insights

One of the strategic approaches to the Mindanao problem is the need to balance national sovereignty and Bangsamoro aspirations for self-determination. As always, the balancing act is not easy because it boils down to the issue of whether or not the Constitution shall be considered as one of the frameworks of the negotiation. A more creative approach is needed to achieve a perfect balance between the Constitution being a fundamental law and self-determination being an inherent right recognized by international law. As to how, only the direct parties are in the best position to determine in a negotiation. Then, consultation with the broad base of the population can take place after a draft is finalized not while it is being negotiated as most people would assert.

It is always possible to explore extra-constitutional means of settling the issue, according to Prof. Randy David, and try to craft out solutions “outside the box”. But how do we look at ‘agreements’ reached out of the bounds of what is allowable under the Constitution? Is it not simply unconstitutional? Or, an out-of-constitution settlement can be allowed for as long as they are generally in the best interest of both parties? It would seem that the bottom-line here is coming out with a clear definition and understanding of the nature of the ‘agreement’ that may be crafted between the GRP and the MILF. If it is a local agreement, ipso facto it is subordinate to the Constitution. If it assumes the nature and character of an international agreement then it can stand outside the sphere of the Philippine Constitution.

There is a need to revolutionize our understanding of the term ‘sovereignty’ as it applies to territorial integrity of a given state and as it is used to connote power and authority. In this sense, Mastura emphasized the traditional Moro statehood ‘earned sovereignty’ is already encapsulated by the Republic in its present form and structure as an autonomous entity presently in existence before the family of nations. Those who speak for the Philippines configure their constituencies into a political community which has beclouded a number of contested constitutional issues in the GRP-MILF negotiation.

The MOA on Ancestral Domain, though unsigned, should be seen as a faithful and earnest attempt to provide a leeway to provide balance between the zealously guarded issues of constitutionalism and sovereignty vis-a-vis self-determination and freedom. The MOA-AD may no longer become operational but it is to be appreciated as a document that embodies hard-earned consensus that somehow manifested that it is possible for some Filipinos and Moros to come to terms even under the most difficult circumstances.

Given a rejected MOA on Ancestral Domain, and maybe eventually a failed negotiation, “the only option available for the Bangsamoro, in lieu of armed struggle, is to revert to the original goal of independence and mount a campaign for decolonization under the auspices of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice” (Atty. Buat). This is, logically, the next best thing. In most bilateral negotiations powerful mediators are necessary requisites to peaceful settlements in almost all sovereignty-based conflicts. From my view, the GRP’s respect for Malaysia as mediator and facilitator in the peace talks is diminished. At the very least, it has doubted Malaysia’s resolve to stay neutral in the negotiation – a suspicion which could have possibly sprung out from the fact that Malaysia is a country being led by Muslims and one of the parties in the talks is Bangsamoro Muslim. While there were open statements on this one, no evidence, however, was cited.

The remaining years of the Arroyo administration (one year and nine months) may still be useful to a certain extent if it can somehow maintain the ceasefire, enhance rehabilitation and development works, and pursue consultation and dialogue, information and education, and building of a constituency supportive to the peace process. It may no longer appear to be a credible negotiator in the eyes of the MILF, after it has reneged on its obligation to sign the MOA-AD, but it can enhance or even just preserve the fundamentals necessary for the next round of talks which may still be possible in the next administration.

To sum it up, the Mindanao problem has taken new dimensions. The issues and controversies involved had become as ticklish as the attitude of people who were supposed to have expressed resolve to do something about it and to bring the peace process towards an acceptable compromise. Slowly but surely, the peace process may be headed towards a kind of reality in Physics: “When an irresistible force meets and immovable object something has to give up”. We can only pray that it is not people’s precious lives and hard-earned properties that should be given up.

What Now

Now, it is high time to ponder on how a new peace talk between the GRP and the MILF may proceed. Whether that is going to take place in this administration (of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo) or in the next is immaterial. The fundamental requirements are the same and only the frameworks and talking points may adapt new patterns and form considering the lessons and realities of past and recent experience with (or of) the peace process.

The fundamental realities stay the same viz:

It is inherently necessary that the peace process and the peace negotiation must continue. No civilized society in its right mind can allow a climate of un-peace and its dire consequences to continue to flourish indefinitely;

It is compelling for both parties (GRP & MILF) to come to terms sooner or later, otherwise, they suffer the consequences of the impatience, ire and loss of faith of their respective populace and constituents in the long run; and

Both parties have suffered enough. While ‘negotiation fatigue’ is likely for either side or both, especially given what I call the ‘lullaby strategy’ of the GRP in dilly-dallying the peace process, the drive to succeed should not be absent from both sides.

The latest fiasco in the peace talks was clearly the offshoot of the following circumstances:

The GRP’s lack of transparency on its part;

As a consequence thereof, some politicians (Pinol, Lobregat, Roxas, Drilon) reacted by questioning the MOA on Ancestral Domain before the Supreme Court. The Pinol-Lobregat petition was simply a mandamus-like relief to require the parties to make available copies of the MOA-AD. It was then logical that the Supreme Court had to restrain the signing of the MOA-AD to give time for people, or just the petitioners, to study the contents of said document. After said petition is served, the TRO may be lifted in due time and the MOA-AD may still be signed thereafter. What really complicated the matter was the Roxas-Drilon intervention asking the Supreme Court, not only to restrain the signing but also to rule on the MOA’s constitutionality. And this has prolonged the ‘legal due process’;

The non-signing of the MOA prompted two ‘uncontrolled’ commanders of the MILF (Kato and Bravo) to stage attacks in North Cotabato and Lanao del Sur which also triggered similar actions, presumably by the MILF also, in Sarangani;

Consequently, these ‘atrocities’ were exhaustively and conveniently used as excuse by the GRP to further justify its position of not signing the MOA “at gunpoint”. Now, criminal cases were filed against Kato, Bravo et al and the rest is a matter of ‘police action’. To concretize its position of not signing the MOA-AD, the Arroyo administration came out with the DDR (demilitarization, demobilization, reintegration) as added frameworks in the negotiation. “The DDR is more of a war strategy than a peace framework”, according to one respected personality in the peace process. As if this was not enough, the Arroyo administration announced the dismantling of the GRP negotiating panel to signal its complete abandonment of the peace talks;

Unspoken reality

The unspoken reality, however, was that the GRP may have realized that its panel was outsmarted by the MILF panel when they saw a somewhat ‘lopsided’ agreement from its point of view. But that was at no fault of the MILF. If the MILF panel was the better negotiator as compared to the GRP panel, that was no reason for the GRP to blame the product. After all, in all probabilities the GRP must have carefully selected the members of its panel.

Given the fundamental realities, how then must the peace talks proceed if and when resumed in the future? Fr. Mercado says: “After an adequate period of dispassionate, informed and intelligent discussion of the concepts and issues by all concerned, after some sanity is restored, the time should come when the parties can viably continue the peace negotiations, presumably from where they left off”.

There are hitches that should be surmounted before the peace talks can resume. If the ‘talks’ resume in the time of the Arroyo administration, the DDR is the first issue to be resolved. If it resumes in the next administration, it will depend on whether or not the new administration adapts or drops some of the frameworks and policies put forward by the Arroyo administration.
The Arroyo administration has learned a painful lesson from the botched Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain and hope that it, or the government in general, will be better prepared for new talks in the future.

Pointers

When the peace talks resume sometime in the future, the following pointers are worth considering:

First, what is needed is a clear, written instruction from the President to the government panel on what it can negotiate with the MILF and what it can sign. At the recent Supreme Court hearing on petitions against the proposed memorandum, Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera said the government panel had authority only to negotiate, not to sign. Fresh instructions for a prospective new panel should spell out clearly the extent of its mandate.

Second, the new panel should be headed by a diplomat who is experienced in international negotiations, not by a retired general who may bring his military mindset to the negotiating table. True, Gen. Manuel Yan was a military general who headed the panel that negotiated with the MNLF, but he was an experienced diplomat before he was appointed to the position. A diplomat is trained to bargain hard, but do it in a tactful manner.

Third, the negotiators have to be backed by a strong panel of experts in constitutional and international law. Had the just disbanded GRP panel been backed by experts in constitutional and international law, it should have taken a more proactive position in defending the MOA rather than silenced by attacks from the media and some politicians.

Fourth, public hearings should be conducted on the main points of the proposed agreement, principally in Mindanao and in key cities of the country. All the stakeholders should be invited to these hearings so that the negotiating panel can hear various views and obtain various perspectives. In the case of the botched MOA-AD, it appears that no public hearings were conducted, and the first time most people, including high-ranking government officials, heard about the proposed agreement was only a few days before it was scheduled to be signed.

Fifth, an extensive and continuing public information campaign has to be conducted on the proposed agreement to keep the people updated on the progress of the negotiations. In the case of the collapsed MOA, it appears that the administration was determined to keep the agreement secret and concealed from the people. Even senators and congressmen didn’t know about the contents of the memorandum, and were furnished copies only after there was a hue and cry in the media and public forums.

Sixth, the government should define the timing of public consultations to allow open, impassionate and intelligent discussions to take place. It is to be admitted that the publics and media cannot intervene at the sensitive formative stage of the issues. Atty. Michael O. Mastura, senior member of the MILF panel, emphasized that “healthy environment for serious debate (should not be) drowned out by the intrusion of the mass media into the negotiating process (which only) encourages the politics of fear at the Metro Manila capital..”

Finally, the GRP panel should act like the MILF panel. The former is more arbitrary as compared to the latter. This was the result of ambiguous mandate given the GRP panel. In fairness the government panel negotiates with all candor and earnest but under a shadow of ‘hit and miss’ situation as Malacanang is more prone to believe the so-called ‘spoilers’ of the peace process than its own panel. The problem with the President is sometimes she equates trust and respect with accommodation. Thus, she makes appointments more on the basis of political accommodation even if she has little of the trust and respect on the appointee. This was quite clear in the case of General Rodolfo Garcia as head of the GRP panel and, more recently, Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson as Deputy National Security Adviser.

We hope the President, if not, the next Administration will do it in more absolute terms next time. We hope the government panel will get it right and do it right next time.